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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL D.O. GRAHAM

FROM: A.W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: Substantive Intelligence Issues

As you requested, I reviewed for a second time the list of substantive intelligence questions. Overall I noted in the geographic areas a general preponderance of military issues as opposed to political or economic issues. While this may reflect an appropriate orientation, I think we should be concerned about whether the list reflects producer bias or consumer need. As for specific topics, I suggest the following topics for your consideration:

-- Intelligence support to negotiations with Panama on the Canal Zone.

-- The possible scenarios of a Sino-Soviet conflict and the implications of outcomes for each nation and other countries of the world.

-- The implications of a resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

-- An in-depth analysis of hypotheses explaining the developments occurring in Soviet strategic weapons systems and programs.

-- A general study of the Soviet leadership and how it may change in the next decade.

-- A comprehensive set of questions related to Soviet ICBMs based upon the NSCIC Working Group's responses to your request for data on issues of consumer interest.

-- More attention to the broad issues of Soviet economic capabilities and vulnerabilities than just grains and petroleum, as discussed in Question #11 "USSR and Europe."

The underlying factors behind the Soviet's strategic weapons program are of great concern to me and those involved in SAL. As I discussed in my

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commentary on intelligence issues of consumer concern relating to Soviet ICBMs, current intelligence production concentrates heavily on technically related issues. Little attempt has been made to get at the underlying forces, causes, and reasons behind the Soviet's strategic programs. Kissinger has expressed his concern with this question repeatedly, Colby is aware of it, and I think it deserves special priority.

These comments reflect my judgments. This list has not been staffed through the NSC staff. I would suggest that be done in the future.

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